Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse For His Judicial Activism
In the excerpt below, from the U. S. Supreme Court's opinion in the case of D. C. v. Heller, authored by Justice Scalia, the notorious judicial activist announces his intention to follow a rule of constitutional construction which dictates that the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense of their normal and ordinary use by ordinary citizens of the founding generation.
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood
by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731
(1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824).
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation...
Scalia is an incompetent activist. The Constitution wasn't made with the lawmakers understanding that it would be interpreted according to the normal and ordinary use of words by ordinary citizens of the founding generation.
John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, knew that there were well established common law rules of interpretation and that they applied to the U. S. Constitution.
The question now before us renders it necessary to pay particular attention to that part of the second section which extends the judicial power "to controversies between a State and citizens of another State." It is contended that this ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies excepting those in which a State may be plaintiff. The ordinary rules for construction will easily decide whether those words are to be understood in that limited sense.
--John Jay in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)