Since late 2009, al-Awlaki "has taken on an increasingly operational role in AQAP," said Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in a statement filed in the court case in August. Awlaki, Clapper said, has recruited terrorists and planned and facilitated attacks in the United States and abroad. IPT News has reported many of Anwar al-Awlaki's terrorist connections, linking him to the Fort Hood massacre, the Christmas Day bomb plot, and the failed Times Square attack. "He has involved himself in every aspect of the supply chain of terrorism—fundraising for terrorist groups, recruiting and training operatives, and planning and ordering attacks on innocents," the U.S. government explained in designating him.
As important as the issues presented in this case are, Bates' opinion suggests he is unwilling to expand judicial access to an individual who has expressed no such interest. "Whatever the reason for Anwar al-Awlaki's failure to seek legal redress for his alleged inclusion on the CIA and JSOC 'kill lists' – a mistrust of or disdain for the American judicial system, a desire to become a martyr, or a mere lack of interest in pursuing a case thousands of miles away from his current location," the court refused to expand access to al-Awlaki.
In addition to dismissing on grounds that Nasser al-Awlaki lacked standing to bring the suit, the court explained that the case was ultimately outside of the purview of federal courts. In a major victory for the executive branch's role in setting counter-terrorism policy, the court explained the complex questions that the judiciary would need to answer in order to review the case:
the precise nature and extent of Anwar al-Awlaki's affiliation with AQAP;
whether AQAP and al-Qaida are so closely linked that the defendants' targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen would come within the United States' current armed conflict with al Qaida;
whether (assuming plaintiff's proffered legal standard applies) Anwar al-Awlaki's alleged terrorist activity renders him a 'concrete, specific, and imminent threat to life or physical safety."
These considerations, the court acknowledged, are simply not within the purview of federal courts. "It is not the role of judges to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, another branch's determination that the interests of the United States call for military action." Although the procedures remain classified, a Pentagon document titled "Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology," shed some light on the procedures for targeted identified terrorists.
Clearly, Bates expressed discomfort with the decision. "This court recognizes the somewhat unsettling nature of its conclusion – that there are circumstances in which the Executive's unilateral decision to kill a U.S. citizen overseas is 'constitutionally committed to the political branches' and judicial unreviewable. But this case squarely presents such a circumstance."
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